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TO THE HONORABLE FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS:
Relator Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”) files this reply in support of
its motion to stay the underlying trial court proceedings pending
review of Facebook’s petition for writ of mandamus filed on October 24,
2019. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10(b).

SUMMARY
Real Party in Interest Jane Doe will not be prejudiced if the
underlying case is temporarily stayed while this Court decides
Facebook’s petition for mandamus, but Facebook will be irreparably
prejudiced if it is not. The FOSTA amendments upon which Plaintiff
attempts to undercut Facebook’s grounds for mandamus do not apply
here, and her counsel’s baseless conjecture about destruction of
evidence is just that. Neither argument justifies forcing Facebook to
engage in expansive discovery and defend against a lawsuit that federal
law bars from the outset. That outcome is precisely what both Rule 91a
and Section 230 were intended to prevent and why the Court should

1
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grant a temporary stay while it considers Facebook’s mandamus
petition.1

FOSTA DOES NOT APPLY
Jane Doe’s opposition to Facebook’s motion for a stay focuses less
on any purported prejudice from a temporary stay and more on
attempting to discredit the grounds on which Facebook seeks
mandamus. But the grounds for mandamus here are strong – the trial
court’s decision denying Facebook’s statutory immunity under Section
230 is at odds with literally hundreds of reported cases, including 19
cases from state appellate and federal courts in Texas (one from the Fifth
Circuit, 15 from U.S. district courts, and three from state appellate
courts).

1

Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledges that discovery is in its infancy, but claims that
“but for Facebook’s continued efforts to resist discovery, the case would be much
further along.” Resp. at 8. But there have been no motions to compel granted against
Facebook in the underlying proceeding, and Plaintiff’s counsel neglects to mention
that until last month, the trial court had not yet ruled on Facebook’s special
appearance. A party is not required to respond to merits discovery when it is
contesting personal jurisdiction. In re Doe, 444 S.W.3d 603, 608 (Tex. 2014); see
also In re Stern, 321 S.W.3d 828, 839-40 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no
pet.). With respect to jurisdictional discovery, Facebook asserted that Plaintiff failed
to satisfy the affidavit requirements of Rule 120a(3) and that discovery would be
futile, because nothing Plaintiff alleged would establish specific jurisdiction.

2
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Faced with this weight of authority, Jane Doe asserts that the Fight
Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017 (“FOSTA”) removed her claims from
Section 230’s purview. But although FOSTA amended Section 230 in
several ways, none of them have anything to do with Plaintiff’s claims.
See Woodhull Freedom Found. v. United States, 334 F. Supp. 3d 185, 190
(D.D.C. 2018) (detailing the scope of FOSTA’s amendments to Section
230).
FOSTA (1) expanded and exempted from Section 230 a federal civil
action for facilitating sex trafficking (which Plaintiff has not alleged);
and (2) exempted state criminal prosecutions and state attorney general
enforcement actions from Section 230 (which Plaintiff could not allege).
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5); Woodhull, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 190. While the
original version of the bill also would have exempted certain private
state law civil actions, that proposal was rejected because Congress
wanted to ensure a uniform national standard in this area rather than a
patchwork of state laws. See H.R. 1865, 115th Cong., § 3 (a)(2)(C) (1st
Sess. Apr. 3, 2017). Because FOSTA did not amend Section 230 in any
way relevant to Plaintiff’s claims (all of which are state law civil claims),
3
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it does not change the relevance of the hundreds of pre-2018 cases
establishing that Section 230 bars them.2
That there are few post-FOSTA decisions regarding Section 230 is a
function of time ― FOSTA was enacted in April of 2018 ― not an indication
of the law’s reach. Indeed, where courts have considered Section 230’s
post-FOSTA applicability to claims involving allegations of sex
trafficking, they have recognized continued immunity from state law
claims. For example, in a case brought by Jane Doe’s same counsel, the
California Superior Court ― which frequently resolves cases involving
Section 230 immunity ― just last month rejected the very arguments made
here: “FOSTA exempted only three categories of sex trafficking claims,”
and “[n]othing in the text of the statutes exempted private civil state law

The FOSTA prefatory clause language that Plaintiff cites changes nothing. A
prefatory clause does not change the meaning of unambiguous operative text. See
Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. U.S, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1977 (2016); Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian
Affairs, 556 U.S. 163, 175 (2009). Here, the operative text making limited amendments
to Section 230 is unambiguous, and FOSTA’s prefatory language is consistent with it.
The “State and federal criminal and civil law” language in the preface accurately
describes the three enacted exemptions for (1) federal private civil actions, (2) state AG
parens patriae actions, and (3) criminal enforcement actions by state AGs. The same is
true for the “Sense of Congress” recitals in FOSTA § 2, which generally state that
§ 230 was “never intended” to immunize bad actor websites that “facilitate” sex
trafficking. The word “facilitate” is not defined, but whatever the meaning, it cannot
alter the operative text of FOSTA’s limited amendments to Section 230.
Kingdomware, 136 S. Ct. at 1978.
2

4
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claims from immunity.” Ex. A, Jane Does #1-#50 v. Salesforce, Inc., CGC-19574770 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 23, 2019).

A STAY WILL NOT IMPACT EVIDENCE
PRESERVATION
As a last resort, Plaintiff’s counsel suggests that a stay could result
in the destruction of evidence by Facebook users through Facebook’s
“Off-Facebook Activity” feature. But, Plaintiff’s claims are already
seven years old (six years at the time of suit), and, with respect to any
relevant evidence that actually still exists at this juncture, Facebook’s
preservation obligations are the same whether there is a stay of
proceedings in place or not. Facebook and its counsel take those
obligations seriously. Put simply, unfounded scare tactics regarding
evidence destruction do not justify forcing Facebook to defend against
litigation from which it is immune.

CONCLUSION
A stay here will “spare private parties and the public the time and
money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal of improperly
conducted proceedings” and “preserve important substantive and
5
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procedural rights from impairment or loss,” In re Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004), while not prejudicing Real Party
in Interest Jane Doe. This Court should therefore issue a temporary stay
of proceedings pending review of Facebook’s petition for mandamus.
Respectfully submitted,
HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP
By:
/s/ Scott A. Brister
Scott A. Brister - SBN 00000024
sbrister@huntonak.com
IBC Bank Plaza
500 West 5th Street, Suite 1350
Austin, TX 78701
Phone: 512.320.9200
Kelly Sandill - SBN 24033094
ksandill@huntonak.com
Kathryn E. Boatman-SBN 24062624
kboatman@huntonak.com
Ashley Kahn – SBN 24087824
akahn@huntonak.com
HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP
600 Travis, Suite 4200
Houston, TX 77002
Phone: 713.220.4200
Fax: 713.220.4285
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document was served on the following counsel of record for Real Party
in Interest Jane Doe via electronic transmission on November 5, 2019:
Annie McAdams
annie@mcadamspc.com
Matthew S. Parmet
matt@mcadamspc.com
ANNIE MCADAMS, PC
1150 Bissonnet
Houston, TX 77005
Michael T. Gallagher
mike@gld-law.com
Pamela McLemore
pamm@gld-law.com
Boyd Smith
THE GALLAGHER LAW FIRM
2905 Sackett Street
Houston, TX 77098
David E. Harris
dharris@shhlaw.com
Louie J. Cook
lcook@shhlaw.com
SICO HOELSCHER HARRIS
802 N. Carancahua, Suite 900
Corpus Christi, TX 78401
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Timothy F. Lee
timlee@warejackson.com
Margaret E. Bryant
margaretbryant@warejackson.com
Michelle R. Meriam
michellemeriam@warejackson.com
WARE, JACKSON, LEE, O’NEILL, SMITH & BARROW, LLP
2929 Allen Parkway, 39th Floor
Houston, TX 77019
/s/ Scott A. Brister
Scott A. Brister
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ORDER SUSTAINING DEFENDANT'S DEMURRER TO THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DISMISSING ACTION WITH
PREJUDICE — CASE NO. CGC-19-574770

1

On September 23, 2019, Defendant Salesforce.com, Inc.'s demurrer to plaintiffs' Second

2

Amended Complaint came on regularly for hearing before the Court. Sharon Arkin appeared on

3

behalf of plaintiffs; Kristin A. Linsley and Matthew S. Kahn appeared for defendant. Having

4

considered the pleadings and arguments of counsel, the Court rules as follows:

5

At the threshold, the Court must decide whether to rule on the demurrer, based on the

6

following facts. On Friday afternoon, September 20, the Court issued its tentative ruling sustaining

7

defendant's demurrer without leave to amend.' The same afternoon, pursuant to the Rules of Court

8

and the Court's local rules, plaintiffs' counsel notified the Court and defendant's counsel that they

9

intended to appear on Monday, September 23, to contest the tentative ruling. However, late on the

10

evening of Sunday, September 22, plaintiffs electronically served and filed a request for dismissal of

11

the entire action without prejudice. In light of this background, plaintiffs contend that the demurrer is

12

moot; defendant, on the other hand, contends that plaintiffs' purported voluntary dismissal is

13

ineffective. The Court permitted the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing this issue, and now

14

agrees with defendants' position.

15

In general, a plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss an action at any time before the "actual

16

commencement of trial." (Code Civ. Proc. § 581(c).) Although the right to dismiss is sometimes

17

referred to loosely as "absolute," it is not: "Code of Civil Procedure section 581 recognizes

18

exceptions to the right; other limitations have evolved through the court's construction of the term

19

`commencement of trial.'" (Cravens v. State Board of Equalization (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 253, 256.)

20

The meaning of the term "trial" is not restricted to jury or court trials on the merits, but includes other

21

procedures, such as an order sustaining a defendant's general demurrer without leave to amend, that

22

"effectively dispose of the case." (Wells v. Marina City Properties, Inc. (1981) 29 Ca1.3d 781, 785,

23

citing Goldtree v. Spreckels (1902) 135 Cal. 666, 672-673.) "The 'purpose' in cutting off the

24

plaintiff's absolute right to dismissal upon commencement of trial is to avoid abuse by plaintiffs who,

25
26
27
28

Plaintiffs' "objection" to the Court's tentative ruling on the ground that it was emailed to only one
of plaintiffs' multiple attorneys is groundless. The tentative ruling sustaining the demurrer
without leave to amend was posted on the Court's website, as contemplated by Cal. R. Ct. 3.1308
and the Court's Local Rules; the Court emailed the full tentative to counsel as a courtesy. And
plaintiffs' counsel unquestionably received it, as shown by their email the same afternoon stating
their intention to appear to contest the tentative.
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1

when led to suppose a decision would be adverse, would prevent such decision by dismissing without

2

prejudice and refiling, thus subjecting the defendant and the courts to wasteful proceedings and

3

continuous litigation.'" (Mesa Shopping Center-East, LLC v. Hill (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 890, 904,

4

quoting Kyle v. Carmon (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 901, 909.)

5
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6

before the court actually rules on a demurrer or motion for summary judgment, but after it issues a

7

tentative ruling granting such a dispositive motion. While our Supreme Court has not decided the

8

issue, and the Courts of Appeal have reached varying conclusions on the issue, the weight of recent

9

authority holds that after an adverse tentative ruling on a dispositive motion has been announced, the

10

plaintiff may not thereafter voluntarily dismiss the action without prejudice to avoid the anticipated

11

ruling. (E.g., Franklin Capital Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 187, 200-203 [summarizing rule as

12

follows: voluntary dismissal is ineffective if taken "in the light of a public and formal indication by

13

the trial court of the legal merits of the case"] [collecting authority]; Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Superior

14

Court (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 769, 776 ["a tentative ruling sustaining a demurrer without leave to

15

amend bars a voluntary dismissal"]; Groth Bros. Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Gallagher (2002) 97

16

Cal.App.4th 60, 70.) The rationale for this rule has been articulated as follows:

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Not only does allowing a plaintiff to file a voluntary dismissal without prejudice in the face of
a tentative ruling that the court will sustain the demurrer without leave to amend waste the
time and resources of the court and other parties and promote annoying and continuous
litigation, but we are persuaded that allowing such dismissal in the circumstances of this case
undermines . . . the tentative ruling system.
(Groth Bros. Oldsmobile, Inc., 97 Cal.App.4th at 70; see also Cowan v. Krayzman (2011) 196
Cal.App.4th 907, 919 [such "conduct smacks of gamesmanship, undercuts the tentative ruling
system, and wastes the resources of the court and opposing parties"]; California Practice Guide:
Civil Procedure Before Trial ¶ 11:253, at 11-14 (The Rutter Group 2018) [observing that rule
precluding dismissal following adverse tentative ruling "seems correct from a policy standpoint"].)
This Court agrees. Accordingly, plaintiffs' request for dismissal is denied, and the Court will
proceed to decide the demurrer.

27
28
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1

Defendant Salesforce.com, Inc.'s demurrer to plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint is

2

sustained without leave to amend. Section 230 of the federal Communications Decency Act

3

("CDA"), 47 U.S.C. § 230, bars the instant claims.

4

"There are three essential elements that a defendant must establish in order to claim section

5

230 immunity. They are `(1) the defendant [is] a provider or user of an interactive computer service;

6

(2) the cause of action treat[s] the defendant as a publisher or speaker of information; and (3) the

7

information at issue [is] provided by another information content provider."' (Delfino v. Agilent

8

Techs., Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 804-805.)

9

The CDA provides that the provider of an "interactive computer service" is immune from

10

liability for third-party information (like the advertisements on Backpage) unless the provider "is

11

responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of [the] information." (47 U.S.C.

12

§§ 230(c)(1) and (f)(3).) The term "interactive computer service" is broadly defined and applies to

13

software providers such as defendant. (47 U.S.C. 230(f)(2),(4) [defining "interactive computer

14

service" to include "any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or

15

enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server" and "access software provider" as "a

16

provider of software (including client or server software), or enabling tools" that "(A) filter, screen,

17

allow, or disallow content; (B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or (C) transmit, receive,

18

display, forward, cache, search, subset, organize, reorganize, or translate content."]; see Zango, Inc.

19

v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc. (9th Cir. 2009) 568 F.3d 1169, 1173-1176 [holding that antivirus software

20

company is a provider of an "interactive computer service" entitled to immunity under section 230];

21

Delfino v. Agilent Techs., Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 805 ["Courts have broadly interpreted the

22

term 'interactive computer service' under the CDA."]; see also, e.g., Gonzalez v. Google, Inc. (N.D.

23

Cal. 2017) 282 F.Supp.3d 1150, 1164-166 [holding that plaintiffs sought to treat Google as a

24

publisher of ISIS's content where they alleged that it knowingly provided ISIS followers with

25

material support including "expert assistance, communications equipment, and personnel"].) Here,

26

although plaintiffs strenuously argue that defendant Salesforce is outside these broad statutory

27

definitions, their argument is belied by their own allegations in the second amended complaint, which

28

expressly allege that defendant's customer relationship management (CRM) software provides
4
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1

"operational support" to Backpage by supplying "tools" that enabled it, among other things, to create

2

platforms for Backpage to contact and procure customers, manage customer histories, provide and

3

manage Backpage's customer database, and provide and manage a secure cloud storage database for

4

Backpage to store and secure the details of its business. (Second Amended Complaint, 1147, 150,

5

152.) Further, as they concede, defendant is not responsible, in whole or in part, for the

6

advertisements placed by third parties on Backpage.com. Defendant therefore meets prong one of the

7

above test.

8
9

Plaintiffs' claims also treat defendant as the publisher of the information. Plaintiffs allege that
Backpage's third-party classified advertisements caused them to be exploited. (Second Amended

10

Complaint, ¶1131, 138.) Defendant can only be liable if it is linked to these advertisements and

11

therefore, plaintiff is treating defendant as a publisher, since its "platform and CRM" enabled

12

Backpage to publish and disseminate content. "Section 230(c)(1) is implicated not only by claims

13

that explicitly point to third party content but also by claims which, though artfully pleaded to avoid

14

direct reference, implicitly require recourse to that content to establish liability or implicate a

15

defendant's role, broadly defined, in publishing or excluding third party [c]ommunications." (Cohen

16

v. Faceboolc Inc. (E.D.N.Y. 2017) 252 F.Supp.3d 140, 156.) Plaintiffs' argument that the CDA

17

applies only to "defamation-type" claims is erroneous as a matter of law. (See Doe II v. MySpace

18

Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 561, 568 ["The express language of the statute indicates Congress did

19

not intend to limit its grant of immunity to defamation claims. Instead, the legislative history

20

demonstrates Congress intended to extend immunity to all civil claims..."].) Defendant meets prong

21

two.2

22
23

Backpage's advertisements caused the harm. (Second Amended Complaint, ¶1131, 138.)
There is no allegation that defendant created the specific content at issue (i.e. Backpage's

24
25
2

26
27
28

Significantly, Backpage itself has been held to be protected by section 230. (See, e.g., Jane Doe
No. 1 v. Backpage.Com, LLC (1st Cir. 2016) 817 F.3d 12, 19-21 [affirming dismissal of claims
against Backpage for engaging in sex trafficking of minors, finding that claims treat Backpage as
the publisher or speaker of the content of the challenged advertisements].) If Backpage itself is
immune under section 230, it is difficult to fathom why a third-party software provider such as
defendant Salesforce, whose connection to the offending advertisements is far more attenuated,
would not be entitled to the same protection.
5
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1

advertisements), and indeed plaintiffs concede it did not. Plaintiffs' claim is that Backpage misused

2

defendant's CRM tools. (Second Amended Complaint, ¶150 [listing defendant's services]; ¶152

3

["Backpage implemented Salesforce's tools and platforms"].) Defendant meets prong three.

4

The court rejects plaintiffs' argument that recent amendments to the CDA allow their state

5

law claims to proceed. These amendments, the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex

6

Trafficking Act of 2017 or "FOSTA," Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018), were signed into

7

law on April 11, 2018. (Woodhull Freedom Foundation v. United States (D.D.C. 2018) 334

8

F.Supp.3d 185, 190 [upholding constitutionality of FOSTA].) FOSTA exempted only three

9

categories of sex trafficking claims: (1) private federal civil claims brought in federal court under 18

10

U.S.C. § 1595; (2) state criminal prosecutions; and (3) state attorney general civil actions. (47 U.S.C.

11

§ 230(e)(5); 18 U.S.C. § 1595(d); see Woodhull Freedom Foundation, 334 F.Supp.3d at 191-192.)

12

Nothing in the text of the statutes exempted private civil state law claims from immunity. The Court

13

is not persuaded by plaintiffs' argument that the general language in the preamble to the amendments

14

overrides the plain language of the amendments themselves. (See Kingdomware Technologies, Inc.

15

v. United States (2016) 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1978 [prefatory clause to legislation "announces an objective

16

that Congress hoped that the Department would achieve . . . , but it does not change the plain

17

meaning of the operative clause"]; Gonzalez v. Google, Inc., 282 F.Supp.3d at 1160-1161 ["It is well

18

settled that prefatory clauses or statements of purpose do not change the plain meaning of an

19

operative clause"].)

20

Finally, the Court declines plaintiffs' request for leave to amend. Plaintiffs had an

21

opportunity to amend their complaint after defendant filed a prior demurrer on the same grounds,

22

although the Court did not rule on that demurrer because plaintiffs submitted their second amended

23

complaint for filing before it could be heard. Further, amendment of the complaint would be futile

24

because plaintiffs' claims "fall squarely within the CDA's immunity provision, as a matter of law,

25

and cannot be cured by amendment." (Igbonwa v. Facebook, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2018) 2018 WL

26

4907632, at *7; see also, e.g., Sikhsfor Justice v. Facebook, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2015) 144 F.Supp.3d

27

1088, 1095-1096 [dismissing claims against Facebook without leave to amend on the basis that they

28

were barred under section 230(c) as a matter of law].)
6
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1
2

Accordingly, defendant's demurrer to the second amended complaint is sustained without
leave to amend, and the action is dismissed with prejudice.

3
4

IT IS SO ORDERED.

5
6
7
8

Dated: October

, 2019
HON. ETHAN P. SCI1ULMAN
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CGC-19-574770
JANE DOES #1 THROUGH #50,SE
SALESFORCE, INC., A 1.T LAWARE CORPORATION AND

'RAFFICKING SURVIVORS VS.

I, the undersigned, certify that I am an employee of the Superior Court of California, County Of San Francisco and not
a party to the above-entitled cause and that on October 03, 2019 I served the foregoing ORDER SUSTAINING
DEFENDANT'S DEMURRER TO THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DISMISSING ACTION WITH
PREJUDICEon each counsel of record or party appearing in propria persona by causing a copy thereof to be enclosed
in a postage paid sealed envelope and deposited in the United States Postal Service mail box located at 400 McAllister
Street, San Francisco CA 94102-4514 pursuant to standard court practice.
Date: October 03, 2019
By7"1=;AN

MATTHEW KAHN
KRISTIN A. LINSLEY
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
555 MISSION STREET, SUITE 3000
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94105

SHARON ARKIN
THE ARKIN LAW FIRM
1720 WINCHUCK RIVER ROAD
BROOKINGS, OR 97415

MATTHEW S. PARMET
1150 BISSONNET
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77005
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